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Posted: March 25, 2003
Updated: April 3, 2003
Overview
Brumley
& Boneh, initially reported this vulnerability to
CERT. Brumley & Boneh, researchers at Stanford University,
have written a paper that demonstrates a practical attack
that can be used to extract private keys from vulnerable RSA
applications. In this way, a remote attacker could derive
private RSA keys.
As reported in the CERT advisory:
"Using statistical techniques and carefully measuring
the amount of time required to complete an RSA decryption
operation, an attacker can recover one of the factors (q)
of the RSA key. With the public key and the factor q, the
attacker can compute the private key. As noted in the VMM/attestation
example in section 4 of the paper, applications that perform
RSA encryption (signing) operations may also be vulnerable.
Similar types of timing attacks are discussed in CERT Advisory
CA-1998-07, a paper by Daniel Bleichenbacher et al., and a
paper by Paul Kocher.
The paper recommends a defense called "RSA blinding"
that introduces an additional random component to the RSA
calculation and makes timing information unusable to attackers.
It appears that many cryptographic libraries and applications
either do not implement RSA blinding or do not make use of
it when it is available. RSA blinding does incur a slight
performance penalty. Although the OpenSSL library used in
the experiments does implement RSA blinding, it is not enabled
by default. Many applications that use OpenSSL, including
Apache mod_ssl, do not use RSA blinding, and are therefore
vulnerable to this attack."
VanDyke Software confirmed on March 14, 2003 to CERT that
SecureCRT when using SSH1 may be subject
to this vulnerability (version 4.0.4 and earlier).
SecureCRT 4.0.6 addresses this vulnerability. No other VanDyke
Software products are subject to this vulnerability since
blinding
is used
for
SSH2 with
RSA
private
keys. For
a complete list of vendor responses, see the listing in the
CERT Vulnerability
Note.
This vulnerability is specific
to SSH1 connections. SSH2 server connections do not share
this vulnerability.
SSH2 offers substantially greater security than SSH1. VanDyke
Software recommends that all SSH1 users switch to SSH2 connections
if possible. Further, those users who do not have an SSH2
server currently available are encouraged to make plans to
migrate to SSH2 as soon as possible.
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Affected Software Versions
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SecureCRT 4.0.4 official or earlier, SSH1 connections
only
SecureCRT 3.x official, SSH1 connections only
SecureCRT 2.x official, SSH1 connections only
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Vulnerability Fix Download
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SecureCRT 4.0.9 - http://www.vandyke.com/download/securecrt/4.0/index.html
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Technical Support
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For further information on the security advisory, please contact VanDyke Software. |
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Advisory Postings
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The original posting of this vulnerability
was made on the CERT
web site on March 25, 2003.
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Revision History
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March 25, 2003 - Vulnerability Note published.
April 3, 2003 - Vulnerability Note updated.
April 17, 2003 - Security Advisory updated. June 19, 2003 - Security Advisory updated.
August 19, 2003 - Security Advisory updated.
October 16, 2003 - Security Advisory updated.
December 4, 2003 - Security Advisory updated.
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